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Replicator equation—a paradigm equation in evolutionary game dynamics—mathematizes the frequency de-
pendent selection of competing strategies vying to enhance their fitness (quantified by the average payoffs)
with respect to the average fitnesses of the evolving population under consideration. In this paper, we deal
with two discrete versions of the replicator equation employed to study evolution in a population where
any two players’ interaction is modelled by a two-strategy symmetric normal-form game. There are twelve
distinct classes of such games, each typified by a particular ordinal relationship among the elements of the
corresponding payoff matrix. Here we find the sufficient conditions for the existence of asymptotic solutions
of the replicator equations such that the solutions—fixed points, periodic orbits, and chaotic trajectories—are
all strictly physical, meaning that the frequency of any strategy lies inside the closed interval zero to one at
all times. Thus, we elaborate which of the twelve types of games are capable of showing meaningful physical
solutions and for which of the two types of replicator equation. Subsequently, we introduce the concept of the
weight of fitness deviation that is the scaling factor in a positive affine transformation connecting two payoff
matrices such that the corresponding one-shot games have exactly same Nash equilibria and evolutionary
stable states. The weight also quantifies how much the excess of fitness of a strategy over the average fitness
of the population affects the per capita change in the frequency of the strategy. Intriguingly, the weight’s
variation is capable of making the Nash equilibria and the evolutionary stable states useless by introducing
strict physical chaos in the replicator dynamics based on the normal-form game.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Kg, 05.45.Ac, 05.45.Gg
A discrete replicator equation is a deterministic
nonlinear map that mathematically models the
selective reproduction aspect of the evolutionary
process in the absence of mutation in a population
with non-overlapping generations. Even in the
very simple case of mutual competition in a pop-
ulation consisting of only two phenotypes, a repli-
cator map may allow for chaotic solutions speci-
fying the relative abundance of the phenotypes.
Here we show that the existence of chaotic solu-
tions is not only dependent on exact mathemati-
cal structure of such maps but also on how much
the difference between the fitness of a phenotype
and the average fitness of the population affects
the per capita change in the relative abundance of
the phenotype. Additionally, we rigorously find
out the kinds of competition—represented as two-
player, two-strategy games—that are allowed in
the formalism so that the replicator maps make
sense physically, meaning that the relative abun-
dances do not come out as negative or more than
what they should be for the entire population. Al-
though the evolutionary process takes the center-
stage in this paper, we emphasize that the repli-
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cator maps have analogous applicability in eco-
nomics, social sciences, learning process, etc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In spite of more realistic statistical frameworks that
include effects of finite-size effects1 and restricted inter-
actions among individuals in a population2, collection
of deterministic formulations3 of evolutionary dynamics
continues to be a fruitful and important approach in un-
derstanding the evolutionary processes mathematically.
In fact, some such very different formulations are part
of a single unified framework4. Replicator equation5,6
is one such formulation of evolutionary game theory—a
phenotypic approach to evolutionary dynamics. For an
evolving population of many types (read phenotypes or
strategies), the replicator equation provides cause-effect
relationship between the frequency (relative abundance)
of a type and the fitness (measure of reproductive suc-
cess) of the type: the per capita change in frequency of
a particular type should be positive/negative when its
fitness is more/less than the average fitness of the pop-
ulation as a whole. In absence of any mutation process,
as is the case with replicator equation, constant fitness
functions for the types doesn’t give any nontrivial dynam-
ics. However, even with the simplest type of complica-
tion, viz., fitnesses are linear functions of the frequencies,
replicator equation becomes nonlinear and consequently
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2exhibits dynamically rich behaviour including chaos7–12.
The replicator equation is very straightforward and
intuitive—all it does is to model, in the simplest pos-
sible way, selection of the fitter traits followed by their
replication (reproduction), hence the name. Thus, it is
not surprising that it finds applications in other pro-
cesses analogous to evolution such as autocatalytic re-
actions in networks13 and reinforcement learning14 apart
from in economics15 and social systems16,17. Evolution-
ary game theory has been successful in explaining the
predominance of certain traits and (biological or social)
behaviours of many living organisms. In any organism,
including human beings, assumptions of strong rational-
ity almost always fails. However, under the more realistic
setting where one should consider the players of a game
only boundedly rational, their survival hinges on their
ability to learn optimal strategies as the game is repeat-
edly played. In fact, such a learning process for the case
of simple two player zero-sum rock-paper-scissors game
leads to low dimensional Hamiltonian chaos when mod-
elled using replicator equation10. Appearance of chaos
in evolutionary game theory means that Nash equilib-
ria and evolutionary stable strategies are not decisive in
determining the final fate of the corresponding games.
Of course, that the replicator equation by virtue of its
inherent nonlinear nature shows chaos is not surprising
at all from a mathematical point of view. What we find
interesting in this paper is that certain discrete (in time)
version of the replicator equation is capable of showing
chaos in two-player, two-strategy games, something im-
possible in continuous replicator equations because of the
restriction imposed by Poincaré–Bendixson theorem18,19.
Moreover more than one discrete versions of the repli-
cator equation with drastically different dynamical be-
haviours exist. It may be remarked that even in a two-
player, two-strategy discrete monotone selection dynam-
ics, which is a superset of replicator dynamics, chaos may
be observed20. Additionally, as we show see in this pa-
per, the discrete replicator equations are more subtle be-
cause they lead to unphysical solutions for the frequencies
meaning that frequency values lie outside the closed in-
terval zero to one. Consequently, one is restricted to use
only such kind of fitness functions so that the solutions
are always physical making a priori identification of such
functions indispensable. This is what we achieve in this
paper. A related earlier work21 didn’t contrast dynamics
of different discrete replicator equations nor did that go
much into the important detailed analytical investigation
of the condition for the existence of realistic physical so-
lutions. After discussing this issue of physical solutions
in Sec. III, we show in Sec. IV how chaos can appear only
selectively in evolutionary game dynamics depending on
what kind of discrete replicator one is working with.
An even more interesting result follows in Sec. V where
we see that the difference of a type’s fitness from the av-
erage fitness, when magnified by a factor (which we quan-
tify by the weight of fitness deviation to be discussed in
the paper), not only effects the rate of per capita change
of a trait frequency but can also render Nash equilib-
ria and evolutionary stable strategies or states useless
by introducing physical chaotic solutions. In fact, it is
the weight of fitness deviation that is seen to govern the
strict physical solutions, including chaotic solutions, in
evolutionary game dynamics with a given payoff matrix
for the corresponding replicator game dynamics. This is
another important result of our present work.
However, before embarking on the technical discussion
of the results, in the very next section we elaborate on
some of the relevant game theoretic concepts that are
going to be extensively used later in this paper.
II. RELEVANT GAME THEORETIC CONCEPTS AND
REPLICATOR EQUATIONS
Non-cooperative game theory studies the strategic in-
teraction of independent individuals with no enforce-
ment of cooperation due to an external agent22. A non-
cooperative game is represented by the set of N players,
each with its own set of strategies and a utility function.
For each individual, the utility function is the map from
the set of strategy profiles to real line R. Recall that a
strategy profile (also called strategy combination) is an
N -tuple which includes one strategy of each player. The
utilities of symmetric normal form game is represented
by a payoff matrix. Let U be the payoff matrix of N
strategy symmetric game, SN be the pure strategy set
and the normalized (non-negative) frequency of strategy
si ∈ SN be given by pi. Let the N -simplex ΣN be the
set of all mixed strategies which by definition includes
the pure strategies. It is customary to call the strategies
for which pi > 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, completely mixed
strategies. Symbolically, U(p,q) gives utility for a player
playing the mixed strategy p against the mixed strategy
q.
Having set up the ideas behind a game, let us intro-
duce two very well-known and extremely useful concepts:
(i) a mixed strategy p ∈ ΣN is a Nash equilibrium if
U(p,p) ≥ U(q,p) ∀q ∈ ΣN ; and (ii) a mixed strat-
egy p ∈ ΣN is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)23 if
∀q ∈ ΣN , either U(p,p) > U(q,p) or U(p,q) > U(q,q)
when U(p,p) = U(q,p). In other words, Nash equilib-
rium corresponds to the strategy profile (which now in-
cludes completely mixed strategies) from which no player
has any incentive to unilaterally deviate and an ESS is
a strategy that cannot be invaded by any initially rare
alternative strategy. It may be emphasized that the word
‘rare’ is in context of a population of players playing a
particular strategy.
We are now well-equipped to introduce the definitions
of ordinally equivalent games and cardinally equivalent
games that have been extensively used in this paper to
understand the dynamics of games of interest.
• Two N -strategy symmetric normal form games
with payoff matrices U(1) and U(2) are said to be
ordinally equivalent games if both games consist
3of same players with same set of pure strategies,
SN , such that U(1)(si, sj) ≥ U(1)(si′ , sj′) implies
(and is implied by) U(2)(si, sj) ≥ U(2)(si′ , sj′) for
all si, sj , si′ , sj′ ∈ SN . The payoff matrices of or-
dinally equivalent games are ordinally equivalent
utilities and one payoff matrix is strictly increasing
transformation of the other24.
• Two N -strategy symmetric normal form games
with payoff matrices U(1) and U(2) are said to be
cardinally equivalent games if both games consist
of same players with same set of mixed strategies,
ΣN , such that U(1)(pi,pj) ≥ U(1)(pi′ ,pj′) implies
(and is implied by) U(2)(pi,pj) ≥ U(2)(pi′ ,pj′) for
all pi,pj ,pi′ ,pj′ ∈ ΣN . Pay-off matrices of car-
dinally equivalent games are positive affine trans-
formation of each other. It should be noted that
cardinally equivalent games have same set of Nash
equilibria and evolutionary stable strategies.
It is clear that two cardinally equivalent games are ordi-
nally equivalent as well but the converse is generally not
true.
Coming to the main topic of this paper, we are in-
terested in the evolution of the frequencies of strategies
in a population of players for whom natural selection is
the only mechanism driving the changes in the frequen-
cies. H. Spencers’ famous phrase ‘survival of the fittest’
hints at differential reproduction based on fitnesses of
the players. Qualitatively speaking, fitness of an indi-
vidual is measured by the individual’s ability to survive
and subsequently reproduce, thereby passing the trait to
progeny25 whose trait would, thus, be that of the parent.
Under natural selection a trait is selected if it outper-
forms the average fitness of the population. Change in
the frequency of a trait type in the strategic interaction
of a population is modeled using a replicator equation.
In what follows, we present how researchers have mathe-
matized these ideas.
Let a population consist of n types corresponding to
n points (p1,p2, · · · ,pn) on ΣN 26. Let Π corresponds
to the fitness matrix of a population with n interacting
types. The payoff of the ith type against the jth type is
given by piij = pTi Upj—the element of Π located at ith
row and jth column. The state of a population, x, is de-
fined by the set of normalized frequencies {x1, ..., xn} on
n-simplex Σn for each type in the population. It may be
noted that the average population strategy p¯ =
∑
i xipi
traverses a unique orbit in ΣN depending on the evolu-
tion of x in Σn. A replicator equation, discussed below,
is designed to model the change in frequency of a state—
it increases the frequency of a better performing type
(trait) and decreases the frequency of under-performing
type (trait)5. The performance is measured relative to
the average fitness of population. The expected fitness
of ith type is (Πx)i and the average fitness of population
is xTΠx. Replicator equation increases the frequency of
ith type if its relative fitness is positive.
Let f(x) : Σn → Σn be the discrete model of replicator
dynamics with components fi (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) . Two of
the common forms21,27–30 of the discrete replicator maps
in vouge in the research literature are:
x′i = fi(x) = xi + xi
[
(Πx)i − xTΠx
]
, (1)
x′i = fi(x) = xi
(Πx)i
xTΠx
, (2)
where i can run from 1 to n. x′i essentially means the
value xi at the very next instant of time being sampled
discretely. For convenience, we term Eq. 1 as ‘type-I’
replicator equation and Eq. 2 as ‘type-II’ replicator equa-
tion.
A state x is an evolutionary stable state of population
if there exists a neighbourhood, Bx, of x such that ∀y ∈
Bx\{x}, state x in not invaded by y26, i.e.,
xTΠy > yTΠy ∀y ∈ Bx\{x} . (3)
Under natural selection, an evolving population
characterised by the underlying strategy profile
(p1,p2, · · · ,pN ) is expected to reach a robust composi-
tion specified by x that is evolutionary stable. Though
there is the possibility that it may never happen. Note
that just in line with the definition of Nash equilibrium
introduced earlier, x is called a Nash equilibrium (NE)
if xTΠx ≥ yTΠx ∀y ∈ Σn. This NE is, by construction,
symmetric.
III. STRICT PHYSICAL REGIONS
From now on we shall focus on the aforementioned two
types of discrete replicator models (Eq. (1) and Eq. (2))
and their dynamics on 2-simplex Σ2. The twelve ordi-
nally equivalent classes of two strategy symmetric nor-
mal form games can be represented31,32 by the following
generalized payoff matrix:
Π = A=
[
1 S
T 0
]
; S, T ∈ R . (4)
In S-T plane, these twelve classes are demarcated by the
straight lines: T = 0, T = 1, T = S, S = 0 ,&S = 1
(see regions i to xii in Fig. 1). It should be remarked
that a two-strategy game with payoff matrix having equal
diagonal elements (e.g., a symmetric coordination game
with two Pareto optimal symmetric Nash equilibria) is
not represented by A; in the context of this paper, a
short but sufficient discussion on such games has been
presented in Appendix A.
Only one symmetric NE exists in Prisoner’s dilemma
(i), Harmony I game (vi), Harmony II game (vii), Dead-
lock II game (viii), Harmony III game (xi), and Dead-
lock I game (xii). This NE is strict and hence is also an
ESS. Chicken game (ii), Leader game (iii), and Battle
of sexes (iv) have only one symmetric NE that happens
to be a completely mixed NE and ESS. The rest three
games Stag-hunt (v), ix, and x have three symmetric
4Nash equilibria — one completely mixed and two strict.
Only the strict ones are ESS’s.
Before we proceed further, let us note a subtle point.
Mathematically speaking, for arbitrary Π, both type-I
and type-II equations can give a mathematical solution
that traces a trajectory in the n-dimensional phase space
Rn but is not bounded in Σn ⊂ Rn. This is physically
not allowed because normalised xi, by definition, must re-
main in the interval [0, 1]∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} at all times;
otherwise such solutions are termed as unphysical solu-
tions. We are mostly interested in physical solutions but
the above-mentioned subtlety motivates us to introduce
the following concepts related to the physical solutions
(solutions that are not unphysical): We say a replicator
equation f has strict physical solutions if f : Σn → Σn for
all initial x ∈ Σn at all times. Since the dynamics of the
replicator maps must depend on parameters S and T , we
now introduce the concepts of strict physical region in S-
T space: A region—subset of R2—in S-T space is strict
physical region for a particular replicator equation if the
equation has strict physical solutions for all points (S, T )
in that region for every initial conditions. This concept
is of central-most importance in this paper.
In what follows we now rigorously find the strict phys-
ical regions for both type-I and type-II equations written
using payoff matrix A:
A. Type-I replicator equation
In two strategy game the state of population is x =
{x1, x2}. Let x1 = x and x2 = 1 − x. The components
of type-I replicator map for payoff matrix A are therefore
given by:
f1(x) = x1+x1
(
(Ax)1 − xTAx
)
; f2(x) = 1−f1(x) . (5)
Let the function f1(x1, x2) of type-I replicator equation
in Eq. (5) be called fI(x). Expanded form of fI(x) as a
polynomial is given as:
fI(x) = (S+T − 1)x3 + (1− 2S−T )x2 + (1 +S)x , (6)
which possibly can have one maximum and one mini-
mum. Map x′ = fI(x) has at most three fixed point
solutions: x = 0, x = 1, and x = x(m) = S/(S + T − 1).
Now to find the strict physical region for the equation
x′ = fI(x), we note the following facts:
1. Whenever dfI(0)/dx = 1 + S < 0, type-I equation
doesn’t give strict physical solution in the region
S < −1 because then the replicator equation maps
all points in some small neighbourhood of x = 0
outside the simplex such that fI(x) < 0.
2. Again, if dfI(1)/dx = T < 0, then type-I equation
doesn’t give strict physical solution because each
point x in some small neighbourhood of x = 1 is
mapped outside the simplex such that f(x) > 1.
FIG. 1. Classification of twelve classes of ordinally equivalent
games. The straight lines S = 0, T = 0, S = 1, T = 1, and
S = T separates S-T space into twelve non-overlapping re-
gions each consisting of a set of ordinally equivalent games.
These twelve sets correspond to the well-known games, viz.,
games of Prisoner’s Dilemma (i), Chicken games (ii), Leader
games (iii), games of Battle of Sexes (iv), Stag-hunt games
(v), Harmony I games (vi), Harmony II games (vii),Deadlock
II games (viii), Coordination I games (ix), Coordination II
games (x), Harmony III games (xi), Deadlock I games (xii).
When played as one-shot game, the games in red region, blue
region, and yellow region consist of only one symmetric NE
whereas the games in green region consist of three symmetric
Nash equilibria. The dashed closed curve is the curve in-
side (including boundaries) which type-I replicator map gives
strict physical solutions. Type-II replicator map’s strict phys-
ical region is given for the region where both S and T are
non-negative.
3. If 1+S ≥ 0 (cf. point 1 above) and T ≥ 0 (cf. point
2 above), and additionally there exists a point of
inflection x∗ = − (1−2S−T )3(S+T−1) (i.e., d2fI(x∗)/dx2 = 0)
of cubic polynomial fI such that it lies outside the
simplex i.e. x∗ /∈ [0, 1], then the map is monoton-
ically non-decreasing on simplex and type-I gives
strict physical solution. (However, when either
1 + S = 0 or T = 0, one should also ensure that
d2fI(0)/dx
2 ≥ 0 and d2fI(1)/dx2 ≤ 0 respectively
for the existence of strict physical regions.)
4. However, if 1 + S ≥ 0 and T ≥ 0 (cf. point 1
and 2 above), and point of inflection x∗ lies on the
simplex, then there are two possible cases:
4a. When dfI(x∗)/dx = 1+S− (1−2S−T )
2
3(S+T−1) ≥ 0,
no points of maximum or minimum exist
inside the simplex Σ2 and the map has
5only strict physical solutions. This is so
because if the slope at the point of in-
flexion is nonnegative then the slope is
non-negative for all {x, 1 − x} ∈ Σ2 and
hence function fI is monotonically non-
decreasing.
4b. When dfI(x∗)/dx < 0, both the points
of minimum and maximum, say xmin and
xmax, lie on the simplex. The map has
strict physical solution if both fI(xmin)
and fI(xmax) lie on the simplex which is
mathematically implied by (S−2)2−4T ≤
0 and (T − 3)2 − 4(1 + S) ≤ 0, respec-
tively. These inequalities are arrived at
by demanding that both cubic equations
fI(x) = 0 and fI(x) = 1 should not have
three distinct real solutions—otherwise,
fI(xmin) or fI(xmax) respectively lie out-
side the simplex.
All the inequalities as discussed above straightforwardly
yield a leaflike region (see Fig. 1) in parameter space S-T
for which type-I replicator equation gives strict physical
solutions.
B. Type-II replicator equation
Type-II replicator equation for payoff matrix A can be
written as:
f1(x) = x1
(Ax)1
xTAx
; f2(x) = 1− f1(x) . (7)
Similar to what has been done with type-I replicator
equation, let fII(x) be function f1(x1, x2) of Eq. (7) for
type-II replicator equation, i.e.,
fII(x) = x
x(1− S) + S
x2 + (S + T )x(1− x) . (8)
Note that when S, T ≥ 0, fII ∈ [0, 1] ∀x ∈ [0, 1] because
generally in that case the denominator is equal to the
positive numerator plus some positive number. Thus,
we conclude that type-II replicator equation gives strict
physical solutions if S and T both are non-negative. This
means that the region given by (S ≥ 0, T ≥ 0) is the strict
physical region.
C. Summary and comparison
The area of the strict physical region (S ≥ 0, T ≥ 0)
of type-II replicator equation is far bigger than the one
(leaf-like region) for type-I replicator equation. Harmony
I games (vi) and Harmony II games (vii) lie in both the
strict physical regions. Chicken games (ii), Leader games
(iii), games of Battle of sexes (iv), and Deadlock II games
(viii) always have strict physical physical solutions when
type-II replicator equation is used. However, when the
FIG. 2. Strict physical chaos in replicator dynamics. (a)
Attractors [fixed points (green), periodic orbits (cyan) and
chaotic orbits (red)] attracting physically strict orbits of type-
I replicator equation as concluded by simulating for the Lya-
punov exponent for many random initial conditions for every
S, T pair on simplex. The sporadic coloured points outside the
leaf-like region may either be spurious (a longer numerical run
might encounter an unphysical phase point) or be owing to a
particular combination of S, T and initial x. The parameter
values in the white region yield unphysical trajectories. (b)
Bifurcation diagram showing period doubling route to chaos
along T = 1 + S (dashed black line in subplot (a)).
type-I replicator equation is used, these games may or
may not be in strict physical region. While the classes of
Coordination I games (ix), Coordination II games (x),
Harmony III games (xi), Deadlock I games (xii) do not
fall in either of the strict physical regions, there are strict
physical regions for the games of Prisoner’s dilemma (i)
and Stag-hunt games (v) but only for type-I equation.
IV. REPLICATOR DYNAMICS IN THE STRICT
PHYSICAL REGION
On doing numerical experiments with type-I replica-
tor equation, as shown in Fig. 2(a), we observe fixed
6Class of Game Type-I replicator equation Type-II replicator equation
Prisoner’s Dilemma (i) Evolutionary Stable State (x = 0) —
Chicken game (ii) Evolutionary Stable State (x = x(m)) Evolutionary Stable State (x = x(m))
Leader game (iii) Evolutionary Stable State(x = x(m))/Periodic Orbits/Chaos Evolutionary Stable State (x = x(m))
Battle of Sexes (iv) Evolutionary Stable State(x = x(m))/Periodic Orbits/Chaos Evolutionary Stable State (x = x(m))
Stag-hunt game (v) Evolutionary Stable States (x = 0 or x = 1) —
Harmony I game (vi) Evolutionary Stable State (x = 1) Evolutionary Stable State (x = 1)
Harmony II game (vii) Evolutionary Stable State (x = 1) Evolutionary Stable State (x = 1)
Deadlock II game (viii) Evolutionary Stable State (x = 1) Evolutionary Stable State (x = 1)
Games (ix)-Games (xii) — —
TABLE I. Types of possible attractors of the two discrete replicator equations corresponding to strict physical solutions for the
twelve different classes of games. Here, x(m) = S/(S + T − 1). An attractor of the replicator equations can be evolutionary
stable state (a stable fixed point) or periodic orbit or chaotic.
points, periodic orbits, and chaotic trajectories for the
games in the leaf-like strict physical region via period
doubling route (Fig 2(b)). Physical chaos is observed
near the tip of the leaf. Similar numerical experiments
with type-II replicator equation doesn’t seem to indicate
existence of either physical chaotic solutions or periodic
orbits. Mostly, we witness that initial conditions asymp-
totically approaches a fixed point attractor.
Type-I replicator map has been illustrated21 to pos-
sess both physical and unphysical chaotic solutions apart
from possessing other invariant sets like fixed points and
periodic orbits. However, a clear analytical insight into
when the solutions are physical or unphysical is unre-
ported in literature to the best of our knowledge. In
addition to gathering this insight, we also intend to con-
trast the dynamics of type-I replicator equation with that
of type-II equation. Moreover, this subsection aids in un-
derstanding the intriguing results to be discussed in the
subsequent subsection. To this end, for later convenience,
henceforth we shall call regions given by S > 0, T > 1;
S < 0, T > 1; S < 0, T < 1; and S > 0, T < 1 re-
spectively as quadrant I, quadrant II, quadrant III, and
quadrant IV. These quadrants respectively are denoted
by the red, the blue, the green, and the yellow regions in
Fig. 1.
A. Type-I replicator equation
For each game in the strictly physical region in quad-
rants II and IV, fI(x) < x and fI(x) > x ∀x ∈ (0, 1)
respectively. Therefore, every initial condition (other
than the unstable fixed points) converges to attractors
x = 0 and x = 1 respectively. These fixed point
attractors are also evolutionary stable states (see Ap-
pendix B for a proof). The other possible fixed point
x(m) = S/(S + T − 1) is unphysical in these quadrants.
Also, it is readily seen that any iterate fmI (x) (m ∈ N)
of fI(x) is either less than x (in quadrant II) or greater
than x (in quadrant IV) ∀x ∈ (0, 1). This implies that in
the plot of x vs. fmI (x), line x = f
m
I (x) doesn’t intersect
the graph of fmI (x) at any point other than x = 0 and
x = 1 in the interval [0, 1]. This means that there are no
m-period orbits for m > 1. Moreover, absence of any un-
stable periodic orbit implies that, by definition, chaotic
attractor can not be realized in the state space of the
type-I replicator equation with parameter values chosen
from the strict physical regions of quadrant II and IV.
fI(x) for games in strict physical region in quadrant
III are monotonically non-decreasing functions for all
x ∈ [0, 1]. The fixed points x = 0 and x = 1 are stable
(and thus evolutionary stable state) while the fixed point
x = x(m) is physical but unstable. Thus for each initial
condition x ∈ (0, x(m)), fI(x) < x and fI(x) ∈ (0, x(m)),
and hence fmI (x) < x, ∀m ∈ N. Therefore, no point
of periodic orbit exists in interval (0, x(m)). Similarly,
fI(x) > x and fI(x) ∈ (x(m), 1), ∀x ∈ (x(m), 1) implying
no point of periodic orbit exists in the interval (x(m), 1)
either. Combining the two results we conclude that type-
I replicator equation consists of no periodic orbit — ei-
ther stable or unstable—and hence chaotic attractor can-
not exist in the strict physical region of quadrant III.
Unlike in other parts of the strict physical regions,
type-I replicator equation for games in strict physical re-
gion in quadrant I possess periodic and chaotic orbits.
Fixed points x = 0 and x = 1 are unstable. Interior
fixed point x(m) is physical but shows different stability
properties for different games. For games in the strict
physical region where S(T − 1)/(S + T − 1) < 2 (green
region inside leaf-like region in Fig 2(a)), the interior
fixed point is locally stable and evolutionary stable state.
Type-I equation undergoes flip bifurcation at x = x(m)
and S(T − 1)/(S + T − 1) = 2 giving rise to two-period
orbit. Subsequently, as S(T − 1)/(S + T − 1) is contin-
uously varied away from 2 other higher periodic orbits
appear and ultimately chaos (red region inside leaf-like
region in Fig. 2(a)) may be arrived at via period-doubling
route (see Fig. 2(b)). In passing, we mention that a de-
tailed example of the route to chaos in a cubic map can
be found in the 1983 paper of Rogers and Whitley33.
B. Type-II replicator equation
Only games ii-iv (Chicken games, Leader games, and
games of Battle of sexes) and games vi-viii (Harmony I
7games, Harmony II games, and Deadlock II games) lie in
the strict physical region of the type-II replicator equa-
tion. The fixed points x = 0 and x = 1 exist in all
the aforementioned games but the (physical) fixed point
x = x(m) exist only for games ii-iv. x = x(m) and x = 1
are attractors (and hence evolutionary stable states5) re-
spectively for games ii-iv and games vi-viii.
For all games in the strict physical region, fII(x) is
a non-decreasing function inside the simplex. There-
fore, for all x in each largest open interval between
the consecutive physical fixed points either fII(x) > x
or fII(x) < x, and fII(x) lies in the same interval.
Therefore for each x in each largest open interval either
fmII(x) > x or f
m
II(x) < x, ∀m ∈ N. Thus, we conclude
that no periodic orbit, and hence no chaotic orbit, is
found in the strict physical region of type-II replicator
equation.
C. Summary and comparision
Chaotic and periodic orbits are completely absent in
the corresponding strict physical region for type-II equa-
tion but they can show up in the strict physical region
for type-I replicator equation. Contrary to what has
been reported in the literature21, surprisingly our nu-
merics doesn’t show chaos in type-I replicator when A
corresponds to strict physical region in a Chicken game.
However, it could just be that a very particular combi-
nation of S, T , and initial states lead to chaos in chicken
game—a possibility not proven to be absent outside the
strict physical region.
In Table I, we have summarized the types of attractors
possible in both type-I and type-II replicator dynamics
for each ordinally equivalent class of games in the strict
physical region.
V. CARDINALLY EQUIVALENT GAMES AND WEIGHT
OF FITNESS DEVIATION
Till now our focus has been on discrete replicator dy-
namics with payoff matrix A that allows for the study
of twelve classes of ordinally equivalent games as far as
the two-player, two-strategy symmetric games are con-
cerned. In each class there are uncountably infinite num-
ber of ordinally equivalent games. Now, within a class
we can shift (by a constant real matix) and scale (by a
constant positive number) A keeping the characteristics
(Nash equilibria, evolutionary stable strategies, etc.) of
the one-shot game unchanged. However, it may be noted
that whereas type-I replicator equation is invariant un-
der a shift of the payoff matrix by a constant matrix but
not under the scale change of the matrix, type-II repli-
cator equation is invariant under the scale change but
not under the shift. Thus, dynamical behaviours of the
solutions to a replicator equation (type-I or type-II) ob-
tained by using two different games that are cardinally
FIG. 3. Weight of fitness deviation governs chaos. Types
of attractors, viz., fixed points (green), periodic orbits (cyan)
and chaotic orbits (red) as obtained by simulating type-I repli-
cator dynamics at (a) γ = 0.04 and (b) γ = 25. Here as in
Fig. 2a only those attractors have been marked that attract
only physically strict trajectories. Note how γ modifies S and
T values at which chaos appears.
equivalent need not be identical.
In view of the above, let us introduce Π = Π2 to be
the general 2×2 fitness matrix such that Π2 is a positive
affine transformation of payoff matrix A, i.e.,
Π2=
[
a b
c d
]
=γ
[
1 S
T 0
]
+
[
d d
d d
]
; γ > 0, & a, b, c, d ∈ R . (9)
More compactly, Π2 = γA + d1. For the sake of con-
venience, we have worked with only non-negative values
of d. A parallel study for negative d can, in principle,
always be done.
There is a very simple physical significance of γ that
we discuss now. The two forms of discrete replicator
equation can be written as5:
∆x
x
= W (x)
(
(Ax)1 − xTAx
)
, (10)
where ∆x = x′ − x and ‘weight function’ W (x) > 0 for
x ∈ [0, 1]. For type-I equation, W (x) = γ and for type-
8II equation, W (x) = 1/(xTAx + d/γ). Eq. (10) can be
interpreted as follows: the L.H.S. denotes the fractional
change in the frequency of state x1 and
(
(Ax)1 − xTAx
)
in the R.H.S. denotes the deviation of fitness of state x1
from the average fitness of the population. The weight
function W (x) associates a weight to this deviation,
meaning it measures how strongly this deviation affects
the fractional change in the frequency of the state. In this
context, it is apt to say that γ acts as weight of fitness de-
viation and will henceforth be termed as such. To under-
stand the essence of this terminology, we may note that
the weight functions are monotonically increasing func-
tions of γ and hence so are the corresponding fractional
changes in the frequency of the states. Eq. (10) reduces
to Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for γ = 1 and γ = ∞ (for finite
d) when used in W (x) = γ and W (x) = 1/(xTAx + d/γ)
respectively.
For the sake of argument, consider one dimensional
continuous replicator equation,
dx
dt
= x
[
(Ax)i − xTAx
]
, (11)
and the corresponding type-I replicator map as its trivial
discretization. Consequently,W (x) or γ in the type-I can
be interpreted as the fixed time interval over which to-
tal payoffs accumulates before the next frequency-update
happens. However, for the type-I map describing non-
overlapping generations, such interpretation of γ is not
relevant; it is a free parameter that essentially highlights
the fact that the dynamics of replicator depends on the
absolute values (and thus on the relative ordering) of the
payoffs rather than merely on their relative ordering. In
continuous replicator equation, γ can be absorbed in the
time derivatives of the frequencies by rescaling time and
hence is of no practical importance but in the discrete
versions this rescaling is not possible and the evolution-
ary outcomes depend crucially on the weight of fitness de-
viation as we witness in the following subsections. That
said, one can interpret (two times) γ as the inverse tem-
perature (interpreted as intensity of selection) appearing
in the Fermi–Dirac distribution function giving the prob-
ability that a pure strategy is replaced by the other in
a pairwise comparison process34. This process reduces
to Eq. (11) in the limit of infinite population and weak
selection.
In what follows, we discuss, among other results, how
the dynamics of the replicator maps can be modified to
bring about strict physical chaotic solutions which may
not be otherwise realised in the corresponding cardinally
equivalent games.
A. Type-I replicator equation
Type-I replicator equation, x′i = fi(x1, x2), for the pay-
off matrix Π2 can be rewritten with:
f1(x1, x2) = x1 + γx1
(
(Ax)1 − xTAx
)
, f2 = 1− f1 .
(12)
As before, it suffices to work with x = x1 only and so we
write
f¯I(x) = γ(S+T−1)x3+γ(1−2S−T )x2+(1+γS)x , (13)
such that x′ = f¯I(x).
The transformations S → S/γ, (T − 1) → (T − 1)/γ
makes f¯I (x) = fI (x) . Therefore, as illustrated in Fig. 3,
changing γ shifts and scales the strict physical region in
S-T parameter space keeping the overall picture topolog-
ically intact. However, more importantly, any change in
γ brings about change in the domains of S-T parameter
space for each type of attractors for the replicator dynam-
ics. Thus, strict physical chaos may occur in a Chicken
game when the weight of fitness deviation is sufficiently
large—something absent if only A (γ = 1 , d = 0) is used.
B. Type-II replicator equation
Type-II replicator equation for payoff matrix Π2 is
given as:
f1(x) = x1
γ(Ax)1 + d
γxTAx + d
, f2(x) = 1− f1(x) . (14)
Type-II replicator equation gives strict physical solu-
tion if a, b, c, d ≥ 0 or a, b, c, d ≤ 0 (see Eq. 9) sim-
ply because the positive denominator of non-negative f1
is the positive numerator plus a positive part, making
f1 ∈ [0, 1]∀x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1]. As usual, we write type-II
equation conveniently as follows:
x′ = f¯II(x) = x
x(1− S) + S + d/γ
x2 + (S + T )x(1− x) + d/γ . (15)
It should be observed that now the strict physical region
is given by S ≥ −d/γ and T ≥ −d/γ and with decrease
in the value of γ the extent of the region increases. The
fixed points are x = 0, x = 1, and x = x(m) whose phys-
ical nature and stabilities depend on which ordinal class
of games the replicator equation is based on. Initial con-
ditions in the appropriate basin of attraction converges
to a evolutionary stable state (one of the fixed points)
in the strict physical region. We note that in the strict
physical region f¯II is a monotonic nondecreasing func-
tion of x in simplex. Thus, arguments analogous to what
has been given in Section IV, periodic orbits or chaotic
orbits are absent in type-II replicator equation for any
payoff matrix Π2 chosen from the strict physical region.
It is further worth noticing that from equation (14) we
can give a physical meaning to d/γ: it is the fitness in
the absence of any interaction.
C. Summary and comparison
Games cardinally equivalent to any of the twelve
classes of games discussed in this paper can have po-
tentially different replicator dynamics. Specifically, it is
9seen that depending on the weight of fitness deviation
(γ), strictly physical chaotic dynamics can be introduced
in some of the classes of games that do not show such
behaviour for γ = 1 in type-I replicator equation. Like-
wise, chaos may be eliminated from a particular game
with specific A by changing the weight of fitness devi-
ation. Contrary to type-I, the implications of cardinal
transformation of A does not lead to any new intrigu-
ing results in type-II: there still is no strictly chaos or
periodic orbits in strict physical region. However, as the
weight of fitness deviation (γ) is decreased then the strict
physical region expands to engulf even those games that
were earlier not inside the strict physical region. In fact,
in the limit γ → 0, the strict physical region tends to R2.
Similar limiting behaviour is also witnessed for the case
of type-I replicator equation as γ is decreased. Thus, tak-
ing γ → 0 pushes the chaotic region (realised at the tip of
the leaf-like strict physical region) towards infinity mak-
ing detection of chaos rather difficult unless one chooses
very large values for S and T . In some sense, this means
that the discrete replicator equation approaches a contin-
uous version of the replicator equation which anyway, be-
ing a one-dimensional autonomous flow, is not supposed
to possess chaotic solutions. In the similar vein, both
the discrete replicator equations approach the continuous
version as the weight of fitness deviation approaches zero
and thus it makes sense that the strict physical regions
in both the cases becomes R2 in the limit; of course, R2
is the strict physical region for the continuous replicator
equation.
VI. IS TYPE-II A BETTER MODEL THAN TYPE-I?
The answer to this question is an emphatic ‘no’. Al-
though it may sound a bit surprising when seen against
the backdrop of the fact that type-II replicator map is
much more commonly used in the literature, we argue in
following three subsections why type-I is as good or as
bad a model as type-II.
A. No control over payoff matrix
The games with the Prisoner’s dilemma’s pay-off ma-
trix structure have been observed in the evolution of com-
petitive interactions in RNA viruses35, cancer cells36,37,
alliance between firms in retail market38, Hobbes’s state
of nature39, and in many other innumerable topics of
biology, economics, and psychology. Similar omnipres-
ence is that of Stag-hunt game: e.g., emergence of
trust-behaviour in population40, evolution of social struc-
ture41, evolutionary dynamics of collective actions in an-
imal world42. We need to appreciate the fact that as sci-
entists we do not have control on the payoff matrices as
they would appear in natural scenario; all we can do is to
model a given natural scenario having an inherent payoff
matrix. The models need to be sensible in not yielding
unphysical solutions. It thus is crystal clear that type-
II replicator map is at disadvantage when employed to
model the discrete replicator dynamics involving payoff
matrices of ubiquitously found Prisoners’ dilemma and
Stag-hunt games simply because the map then gives un-
physical solutions. Better model in such cases is obvi-
ously type-I map. A relook at Fig. 1 and similar consid-
erations suggest there are games where however type-I
map is a bad model but type-II is sensible one. Hence,
we conclude that having no control on the payoff matrices
means that both type-I and type-II models can turn out
to be unphysical and useless models in certain natural
scenarios.
Of course, one may argue that in the context of evo-
lutionary biology, the fitness of a trait should be inter-
preted as the expected number of offspring with that very
trait27. This means that the payoff matrix elements must
all be non-negative (in our case S, T ≥ 0) so that not only
the fitnesses are non-negative but also the dynamics gives
physical phase trajectories. However, as emphasized ear-
lier, the replicator equations have far wider applicability
than just mathematizing Darwinian evolution; the repli-
cator equation is used in economics, social sciences, etc.,
where some elements of the payoff matrix may be taken
to be negative rendering type-I map naturally useful in
modeling the corresponding dynamics.
Interestingly, the type-I equation may be seen as a sim-
plified version of the type-II equation as follows: The
weight function, W (x), of the later is frequency depen-
dent and decreases with the increase in the average payoff
of the population. This means that for a given differ-
ence between the expected payoff of a pure strategy and
the average fitness of the population, the relative change
in frequency is comparatively less for the case in which
the average fitness of the population is more. Critically
speaking, this appears to be an artificial condition added
to the basic tenet of Darwinism. Interestingly, from the
expressions ofW (x) for the two maps, one can easily con-
clude that if we simplify the type-II model by imposing
the condition that the relative change in the frequency
be independent of the average fitness of population (for
a given excess of fitness of a strategy over the average fit-
ness), we essentially arrive at the type-I model. It must
be noted, probably not surprisingly, that the aforemen-
tioned independence is inherent in the continuous repli-
cator equation.
B. Theorems relating NE to attractors
In population biology, folk theorems—relating evolu-
tionary outcome of a system to the NE behaviour—have
facilitated paradigm shift towards strategic reasoning6,
practically elevating the players to the status of ratio-
nal decision makers. However, a parallel well-known fact
is that emergence of chaos (either in continuous or dis-
crete models) means that rationality is probably unreal-
istic approximation10. By now we have seen that in the
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first quadrant in S-T space while type-II map doesn’t
show chaos or oscillatory dynamics, type-I map does;
both however have fixed point solutions. This doesn’t
at all mean that type-II is a better model. In fact, it just
means that type-II is dynamically less rich. Of course,
in order to claim that type-I map in on similar footing
as type-II map, we must relate its (fixed point) solutions
to the NE and following theorems (see Appendix C for
proofs) accomplish exactly that:
1. If xˆ ∈ Σn is a NE of the population game described
by the payoff matrix Π, then xˆ is a fixed point of
type-I replicator map.
2. If xˆ is ω-limit of an orbit x(tn) ∈ intΣn, then xˆ is
a NE.
3. If a fixed point, xˆ, of type-I replicator map is Lya-
punov stable then it is NE.
Thus, even in this respect the type-I model is as good as
the type-II model.
C. Equilibrium concept in game theory and m-period orbits
We know that 1-period stable orbits, i.e., fixed point
attractors, in discrete replicator dynamics are evolution-
ary stable states and hence, by definition, Nash equilib-
ria. However, since the type-1 map is capable of show-
ing m-period attractors, it is very important to find their
connection with game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. To
this end, we note that in case x(1) (this choice of notation
is for later convenience) is a mixed NE, following is valid:
(Πx(1))i = x
(1)TΠx(1), ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, (16)
which also means that x(1) is a fixed point or 1-period
point. Now, multiplying Eq. (16) with x(1)i we get the
equivalent condition for mixed NE:
x
(1)
i (Πx
(1))i = x
(1)
i [x
(1)TΠx(1)]. (17)
The physical meaning of this equation is that the normal-
ized total expected payoff of the entire set of ith pheno-
typic individuals, making fraction xi of the population, is
equal to the normalized average total payoff of any ran-
domly chosen fraction (x(any)) of individuals (not neces-
sarily of a common phenotype) such that x(any) = xi for
any allowed i. We have merely recast the interpretation
of the NE with the benefit that this interpretation al-
lows us to logically extend the concept of the equilibrium
in the following way: Suppose there exists an m-period
orbit—{x(1), x(2), · · · , x(k), · · · , x(m)}, i.e.,
x
(k+1)
i = x
(k)
i + x
(k)
i
[
(Πx(k))i − x(k)TΠx(k)
]
, (18)
for all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m} and x(m+1) ≡ x(1).
Now, consider the following generalization of NE or
Eq. (17):
m∑
k=1
x
(k)
i (Πx
(k))i =
m∑
k=1
x
(k)
i [x
(k)TΠx(k)], (19)
and the obvious extension of the aforementioned phys-
ical meaning, now over m generations, that applies to
Eq. (19). By adding all the m equations implied by
Eq. (18), we see that Eq. (19) is also the necessary con-
dition for the existence of the m-period orbit. Thus,
we have connected the game-theoretic concept of the ex-
tended NE with the evolutionary outcome—m-period or-
bits of type-I replicator map—of the corresponding dy-
namical system.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Replicator dynamics is best realised in an infinitely
large well-mixed unstructured population. In this paper,
we have theoretically investigated and contrasted the dy-
namics of the two types of most commonly used discrete
replicator equations—type-I and type-II. In principle,
this study could be done with any number of players and
strategies. Unlike for the case of continuous replicator
equations, the discrete replicator equations are capable
of showing rich dynamics including chaos even for two-
player, two-strategy scenario. Hence, in this paper we
have focussed on this simplest possible nontrivial repli-
cator equations in order to understand the interplay of
chaos and the underlying simple games that governs the
evolutionary dynamics dealing with the interaction and
subsequent differential reproduction of individuals in a
population. As emphasised again and again in this paper,
it is more tricky to interpret the solutions of the discrete
replicator equations because for some parameter values,
the variables (normalised frequencies of traits) takes val-
ues outside the interval [0, 1] which is physically mean-
ingless. This motivated us to analytically find the suf-
ficient conditions for the existence of the strict physical
regions in the parameter space such that any trajectory in
the state space of the corresponding replicator equation
always remains meaningfully bounded: the frequencies
of the traits can neither have negative values nor values
greater that unity. In the process we find that among the
twelve classes of ordinally equivalent games, on which the
replicator equations are based, only games ii-iv (Chicken
games, Leader games, and games of Battle of sexes) and
games vi-viii (which includes Harmony games) lie in the
strict physical region of type-II replicator equation. For
type-I equation two more games—Prisoner’s dilemma (i)
and Stag-hunt games (v)—may show up in the corre-
sponding strict physical region depending on the param-
eter values. We also note that while physical chaos is
not witnessed in the dynamics of type-II equation in the
strict physical region, it does show up in the dynamics
of type-I equation. However, in S-T parameter space the
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region corresponding to chaos is highly localised near the
tip of the leaf-like structure (see Fig. 2a). This means
that type-I replicator equation based on payoff matrices
of most games, except Leader game and Battle of sexes,
do not show chaos for the parameter values in the strict
physical region.
Interestingly, on invoking the concept of the weight
of fitness deviation, we discover the following important
facts: Firstly, the extent of the strict physical region in-
creases with the decrease in the weight of fitness devia-
tion; and secondly, games (other than Leader game and
Battle of sexes) such as Chicken game may start showing
(strict) physical chaotic solutions in the corresponding
replicator dynamics as the weight of fitness deviation in-
creases. Thus, we note that it is γ which governs the
existence of physical chaos for a given value of S and
T . Similarly, for the case of type-II equation, decreasing
γ sufficiently makes any of the twelve classes of games
come into the strict physical region for the equation.
But, of course, no chaotic behaviour is still observed. As
a byproduct of our study we have also proven that the
chaos reported21 in type-I replicator with Chicken game’s
payoff matrix cannot occur in the strict physical region.
Replicator equations are traditionally used to model
the evolutionary game dynamics in infinite population so
that stochastic effects can be ignored. It is encouraging
that though more realistic stochastic approaches includes
the effects of finite population size effects, the determin-
istic dynamics has been successfully invoked many times
to gain basic understanding of the system. There is an-
other simplifying assumption: each individual interacts
with every other individual in the population. On re-
laxing this assumption, meaning on introducing different
numbers of interactions for different individuals, we ex-
pect the payoff matrix elements to be stochastic in na-
ture. This is another way of introducing stochasticity in
the game dynamics. In contrast to the randomness intro-
duced in the dynamics of the variable due to stochasticity
in various ways, simple deterministic discrete replicator
equations introduce unpredictability in the dynamics ow-
ing to chaos that in turn owes its origin to the nonlinear
nature of the replicator equations. Nash equilibria and
evolutionary stable states are no longer decisive when the
system is chaotic. In fact, replicator equations are also
used to model reinforcement learning where it may be ar-
gued10 that chaos is a necessary condition for intelligent
adaptive players to fail to converge to a NE. In passing,
it may be mentioned that using local replicator equa-
tion43 one may connect evolutionary models for infinite
and finite populations when the population itself is infi-
nite but interactions and reproduction occur in random
groups of finite size. Intriguingly, the local replicator
dynamics is effectively the traditional replicator system
with a slightly modified payoff matrix.
Replicator equation does not take mutation into ac-
count and hence our investigation may be extended for
replicator-mutator equation in order to include the effects
of mutation on the extent of the strict physical region
and the chaotic solutions therein. Such a research with
the discrete versions of replicator-mutator equation will
ascertain the role of chaos in the deterministic evolution
of the universal grammar that specifies the mechanism of
language acquisition44,45. Also, investigation done in this
paper can be extended for two player asymmetric games
which in the continuous case are known to occasionally
exhibit Hamiltonian chaos10.
Before we end, it should be realised that the replicator
equations are mere models of evolutionary dynamics (and
many other analogous systems). Whether they are good
models can only be justified through compatible obser-
vations and experiments. If the system under considera-
tion is showing irregular behaviour (like non-convergence
to NE, bounded but ever-wandering phase trajectories,
etc.) and it is wished to model it using deterministic
models, then one should choose the model that is capa-
ble of showing chaos—specifically, type-I equation and
not type-II equation. In the continuous version, a neces-
sary condition for chaotic solutions to appear is that the
square payoff matrix A should be at least four dimen-
sional. Hence, it is more cumbersome to model chaotic
dynamics by using continuous replicator equations than
by using the discrete ones for which even one-dimensional
state space is enough. However, in spite of this advan-
tage of discrete equations, it also has to be justified on
physical grounds why and when one should use a dis-
crete equation and not the continuous version of it. An
answer to this question might be given on case to case
basis. While one obvious case for using type-II replicator
equation is when the generations of a population are ap-
proximately non-overlapping46,47, another one could be
when one may want to model a discretely sampled data
of a population for which the relevant variables are not
known a priori.
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Appendix A: The leftover games
We may note that the form of A, although has the
advantage that one needs to worry about only two inde-
pendent parameter, viz., S and T , it definitely doesn’t
take into account the games with payoff matrix of the
form
Π = B =:
[
0 S˜
T˜ 0
]
; S˜, T˜ ∈ R. (A1)
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The corresponding type-1 replicator equation is
f˜I(x) = (S˜ + T˜ )x
3 + [−T˜ − 2S˜]x2 + [1 + S˜]x . (A2)
It is interesting to note that the transformation:
S˜ → S, T˜ → T − 1, (A3)
gets us the replicator equation back with Π = A [see
Eq. (6)]. Thus, all the results pertaining to the replicator
map with payoff matrix A can be trivially extended to the
case of the replicator map with payoff matrix B by mere
replacement of S and T by S˜ and T˜ + 1 respectively.
Again, with B, the type-II replicator map is,
f˜II(x) =
x(1− x)S˜
x(1− x)(S˜ + T˜ ) . (A4)
From the form of this map, it is clear that the region given
by (S˜ ≥ 0; T˜ ≥ 0) is the strict physical region because
the numerator of the righthand side is never greater than
the denominator of the righthand side.
Appendix B: Stable fixed point of type-I replicator equation is
evolutionary stable state
We have for two-player, two-strategy type-I discrete
replicator equation:
x′ = x+ x
[
(Ax)1 − xTAx
]
. (B1)
To prove: If xˆ is a stable fixed point of above equation,
then the corresponding state xˆ = (xˆ, 1−xˆ) is evolutionary
stable state, i.e., ∃Bxˆ ⊂ Σ2 such that ∀y ∈ Bxˆ\{xˆ},
xˆTAy > yTAy.
Proof: If xˆ is a stable fixed point of map then there
exists a neighbourhood, Nxˆ of xˆ in (0, 1) such that ∀ y ∈
Nxˆ\{xˆ} we have:
||y′ − xˆ||
||y − xˆ|| < 1 , (B2)
or,
||y − xˆ+ y [(Ay)1 − yTAy] ||
||y − xˆ|| < 1 , (B3)
or,
||y − xˆ+ y(1− y) [(Ay)1 − (Ay)2] ||
||y − xˆ|| < 1 . (B4)
Here, || · · · || stands for an appropriate norm which we
can conveniently take as the Euclidean norm. Inequal-
ity (B4) implies that y− xˆ and (Ay)1− (Ay)2 must have
opposite signs. Therefore if xˆ is stable then there exists
a neighbourhood in Σ2, viz., Bxˆ = Nxˆ × (0, 1)\Nxˆ such
that
(y − xˆ) [(Ay)1 − (Ay)2] < 0∀ (y, 1− y) ∈ Bxˆ, (B5)
⇔ xˆTAy > yTAy, (B6)
i.e., xˆ is evolutionary stable state (and hence also NE).
Remark: The converse of the theorem also holds true
as the above steps can be traced backwards.
Appendix C: Proofs of theorems relating NE to fixed points
The following proofs for type-I equation closely follow
its continuous counterpart.
1. If xˆ ∈ Σn is a NE of the population game described by
the payoff matrix Π, then xˆ is a fixed point of type-I
replicator map.
If xˆ is a NE, then ∀x ∈ Σn, xˆTΠxˆ ≥ xTΠxˆ. We denote
the corners of the simplex with standard unit vectors ei
each of which corresponds to a pure strategy. Choosing ei
as x, we arrive at (Πxˆ)i = constant ∀ i such that xi > 0.
This is nothing but the condition for xˆ to be the fixed
point in the interior of the simplex.
For the case when xˆ is a strict NE, xˆ = ei for i =
k (say), since strict Nash strategy must be pure. This
means, by definition, xˆTΠxˆ = (Πxˆ)k which implies that
ek is the fixed point as well.
2. If xˆ is ω-limit of an orbit x(tn) ∈ intΣn, then xˆ is a NE.
Assume that xˆ is an ω-limit of an orbit x(tn) in intΣn
but is not a NE. Then ∃ > 0 and an i ∈ {1, · · · , n}
such that, (Πx)i − xTΠx > . (This means that x in the
neighbourhood of xˆ and on the orbit, is not a NE; had it
been a NE then it must have been a fixed point thereby
restricting the orbit from further approach towards the
ω-limit, xˆ.) This implies ∆xi/xi > , meaning that for
sufficiently large interval of time an orbit x(tn) diverges
away from xˆ. This is a contradiction since xˆ is the ω-limit
of an orbit x(tn) ∈ intΣn. Thus, xˆ must be a NE.
3. If a fixed point, xˆ, of type-I replicator map is Lyapunov
stable then it is NE.
If we assume that xˆ is Lyapunov stable but is not a
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